During 1974-79 Brazil paid average dollar interest rates that, calculated on either gross or net debt, were substantially below the growth of its dollar import and export prices (the gross average is 9.8 percent; the net is 11.5 percent; average LIBOR was 8.4).3 By late 1979 a worried borrower might have feared a return to positive real rates of interest, at least after the 1980 adjustment to the second oil shock. An expected nominal rate of interest for Brazil of 12.5 percent, and an equal growth in the gross and net debt, are assumed in the counterfactual projections presented below. Those projections could have anticipated in 1979 that prudent bankers would supply the required funds at the indicated interest rate.
What about export volume? Its growth after 1973 remained remarkably high and reasonably steady: it averaged more than 7 percent a year 3. The numbers have been calculated by averaging the implicit annual interest rates. These rates were obtained by comparing actual interest payments (either gross or net) with the debt (either gross or net) for the end of the previous year. If the implicit rates are calculated using the contemporaneous midyear debt (estimated as a simple average of the end-of-the-year debts), the gross average becomes 8.7 percent, and the net, 9.7 percent. Ihese latter numbers, especially the gross interest estimate, yield unrealistically low spreads over LIBOR, the London Interbank Offer Rate. A share of Brazilian international reserves during these years was held in assets earning little or no interest; gold holdings averaged 1.4 million fine troy ounces. The results of the counterfactual exercise are presented in table 1, which also shows the actual data for 1979, a year when the overall balance of payments showed a deficit of $3.2 billion. Perhaps the most striking result is the required contraction in the volume of merchandise imports, which even by 1983 does not recover to its 1979 level. A comparison of the counterfactual projection of import volume for 1980-82 with that actually registered during 1977-79 reveals a decline of 18 percent. It may be argued that this projection goes beyond prudence in at least one respect: the implied ratio of international reserves to imports rises from about 0.54 in 1979 (comparing end-of-the-year reserves with imports for that year) to 0.67 in 1980 and declines thereafter to 0.61 in 1983. Imposing a 1:2 ratio of reserves to imports, however, would make available for imports only an additional $1.4 billion a year at current prices, not enough to change the broad picture of real import decline sketched in table 1. Such an assumption, of course, would imply a decline in the ratio of reserves to gross debt.4 Similar results would apply to less stringent borrowing limits. What real GDP growth could have been expected by the prudent planner, given the gloomy projections for imports? The estimation of import functions in Brazil is rendered especially difficult by quantitative restrictions and lack of data. Following the careful work of Eduardo Modiano, however, one can suppose an income elasticity in the demand for all imports of between 1.0 and 1.2, and a price-elasticity of demand of -0.2 for oil and wheat imports and -1.2 for other imports.5 During 1979 petroleum and wheat represented about 40 percent of total Brazilian imports. As a first approximation, then, a real devaluation of 20 percent would have been necessary to reduce imports by 16 percent while holding output constant. A full pass-through, including oil, would have been six months, paying cash, even if gross trade credits went to zero. The reserve-debt ratio has been found to be an important influence on spreads charged to borrowers in the international financial markets, at least in some studies analyzing the years before 1982.
5 indirectly, by the financing of Brazilian merchandise exports. Argentina, Chile, and Poland purchased Brazilian goods, in part drawing on external loans; in turn, Brazil provided credit for an increasing share of its manufactured goods during 1980-82. As export subsidies were reduced after 1978, export credits were increasingly used as an offset; during 1980-82 gross export credits accounted for about 20 percent of manufactured exports, according to the Banco Central do Brasil. These trends are behind stories from late 1982 alleging that a nontrivial share of the reported Brazilian international reserves was made up of short-term Polish IOUs. Table 4 suggests that the seizing up of international financial markets during 1982 had a more direct impact on Brazilian exports than either the weakness of oil prices or the depression (or protectionism) of the industrial countries. But of course the problems in financial markets would be difficult to explain without the post-1979 macroeconomic trends in industrial countries, and it remains true that Brazilian 1982 Using the more realistic rates in column A, one can decompose the surprises in net interest payments shown in table 2 into three parts: those arising from higher-than-expected interest rates, given the counterfac- A number of major points are apparent in this counterfactual exercise. Brazilian authorities followed a risky growth strategy for 1980, which was very debatable even ex ante. By 1981, however, they were on the way to correcting the 1980 mistake, albeit in a half-hearted fashion (for example, the real exchange rate was moving in an opposite direction from the desirable trend, partly due to unexpected dollar appreciation vis-a-vis other major currencies, but also due to inconsistent domestic policies). If backward-looking indexing was not well suited to accommodate relative price changes, the post-1964 authoritarian style of economic policymaking was even less suited to seek consensus on how to share the burden of adjustment to post-1979 terms of trade and other circumstances, and this could not be blamed on previous governments. Adding to the difficulties of finding an economic policy with a minimum of support were the opposition's fears of jeopardizing the fragile process of democratization. Erratic policy changes also contributed to the collapse of the credibility of government economists, even among conservative groups, both Brazilian and foreign.
The political quagmire has hidden a substantial private consensus in Brazil on the diagnosis and broad remedies for the crisis. Foreign exchange shortages are viewed as the major constraint on Brazilian growth; contrary to the views of this problem held during the 1950s, now shocks to the capital account are thought to be as important as those in the current account. Although real income (not product) losses arising from a permanent deterioration of the terms of trade (at most, 4 percent of GNP) cannot be recouped, and although some reallocation costs may also be inevitable, most observers within Brazil emphasize the avoidance of "secondary" adjustment costs, which would cut output without bringing significant gains to the balance of payments. Widespread bankruptcies induced by extravagant real domestic interest rates and recession, for example, which destroy many years of "learning by doing," are viewed as a secondary burden, a hardship not really necessary to cope with the balance-of-payments crisis. On the other hand, even opposition economists, if pressed, will concede the need to reduce real wages in terms of tradable goods-that is, to raise the exchange rate relative to money wages. The 1979 wage law appears to have been effective in maintaining average real wages at about 1977-79 levels during 1980-82, while decreasing the spread around that average real wage.
Fragmentary data on imports of machinery and equipment and on domestic production of capital goods suggest a sharp decline in investment during 1981-83. Because of the nature of national accounting, these events will eventually be registered also as a contraction of domestic saving. Analysts fond of ex post identities may rush to argue that a lack of incentives to save, rather than foreign exchange difficulties, are behind the Brazilian crisis. Yet an autonomous and nonselective increase in private or public saving under present circumstances is unlikely by itself to bring much relief to the balance of payments; instead it might lead mainly to a further decline in output. Two-gap analysis is alive and well in Brazil (as convincingly argued by Bacha). 1I1 Because of an acute short- run complementarity between domestic and imported inputs (including oil), rigid debt-service commitments, and internal and external limits on the quick expansion of foreign exchange earnings, an economy in which the sum of imports and exports amount to about 20 percent of GNP and in which there are substantial actual and potential domestic resources has become dependent for its short-term performance on the few additional billion dollars that may be wrangled from fitful foreign bankers.
What about the public deficit, passive monetary policy, and accelerating inflation? Consensus on these areas is shakier, but an informed view common within Brazil is that a weak link exists between budget deficits, on the one hand, and the balance of payments and inflation, on the other. The dynamics of inflation are viewed as being dominated in the short-run by backward-looking indexing rules while only a minority regards excess demand as the major source of either internal or external imbalance since 1981.12 There is considerable concern, and not just among entrepreneurs in the private sector, about the size and flabbiness of the public sector, whose enterprises account for a good share of fixed capital formation. The opaqueness of the labyrinthian public sector budget is regarded as a national disgrace, the product of an authoritarian state that need not render clean accounts. A promiscuous intermingling of the budget for public enterprises, the accounts of the monetary authority, and the budgets for the federal, state, and local governments makes clear and up-to-date knowledge of public finances nearly impossible. Massive subsidies to agricultural producers (not exactly the poorest of the poor), for example, appear in the monetary budget. Different approaches to inflationary accounting make the measurement of the budget deficits even more confusing, as is seen below. If balanceof-payments pressures were to disappear overnight, and if indexing rules were revised to break the inflationary spiral, afresh look at the Brazilian public sector would remain a high priority for a government committed to fair and efficient growth, while a cleaner separation of fiscal and monetary policy would seem like a necessary first step for rational macroeconomic policymaking. But neither a sudden tightening of monetary policy nor an across-the-board slashing of public investment will necessarily move toward achieving the desired medium-term reforms in the public sector.
The balance-of-payments crisis in the early 1980s and its impact on public finances has given new relevance to other old-fashioned fiscal policy points. Much of the Brazilian public expenditures is indexed, not just to the general price level, but to the exchange rate. Servicing the foreign debt is an obvious example. Shocks calling for a change in the real exchange rate will affect the budget unless the public sector is in some sense hedged against such an event-for example, by having a portion of tax revenues tied to tradable-goods prices or to profits in the tradable-goods sector. Without such hedging in the revenue base, temptation will grow to use multiple exchange rates as a fiscal rather than a balance-of-payments tool.
In short, the opinion is widespread in Brazil that handling the crisis needs to go beyond calls for "gradualism" and an "incomes policy," phrases that mean many things to different people and are even invoked to praise post-1964 authoritarian policies. Adjusting in the short-and medium-term to the external circumstances of the 1980s while maintaining growth and controlling inflation is likely to involve either a genuine democratic opening, with broad political support needed to make painful adjustment measures work, or a sharp return to an authoritarian system. The difficult task of seeking both economic and political solutions to the crisis is made more explosive by the presence of foreign actors who have a classic role that does not call for political subtlety and who are perceived with hostility by influential segments of Brazilian public opinion. The entire matter has been well summarized by a perceptive observer of many scenes: 13 Financial discipline and reasonably efficient markets are quite desirable, even indispensable, in the medium term. But that does not mean, of necessity, that the transition should take a form hostile to society and progress. We therefore have to look to ways of shaping a broad social consensus supportive of stabilization. But this means, of course, that incomes policy is the cornerstone of effective, socially acceptable conditionality. Effective stabilization is, above all, not a technical issue but a political one. An earnest effort to meet the 1984 targets will involve a significant cut in public real aggregate demand; unless an implausible "crowding in" occurs, recovery from the Brazilian depression of the early 1980s will be weak or nonexistent. Domestic opposition to the new letter of intent and associated policies has been intense: during October 1983 the revitalized Brazilian Congress defeated a decree law restricting salary increases for the next two years to 20 percent below the cost-of-living increase. At this writing, it remains moot whether political circumstances will permit desirable changes in relative prices, particularly the ratio of nominal wages to the exchange rate, in a context of neither explosive inflation nor a further cut in output. What began in September 1982 as a serious economic problem for Brazil had become a year later a profound political and institutional crisis, threatening not only that country, but also the credibility of a beleaguered IMF.
Besides traditional debates over stabilization policies, recent Brazilian discussions with foreign creditors have highlighted three issues. The first is the previously mentioned controversy over the proper measurement of the public sector deficit, and over the link between that deficit, somehow measured, and inflation and the balance of payments.16 As a result of changes in the price level and the exchange rate, the public sector may experience capital gains and losses on outstanding debt: the change in the real value of the public sector liabilities would be the proper measure of the deficit; this measure is shunned by the IMF, which prefers to use the looser concept of "public sector borrowing requirements. " The latter measure could be positive, due to nominal amortizations, while the former measure yields a budget surplus. The issue remains an accounting one unless either measure is related to notions about how the economy operates; specifically, the measures have to be related to aggregate demand, inflation dynamics, and the behavioral patterns in financial markets. Accounting nevertheless remains important because it influences the aspects of the policy debate that get the greatest public attention; claiming that the Brazilian budget deficit is 16 percent of GNP is more than twice as stunning as saying it is 8 percent of GNP, afigure which, after all, is not so different from the corresponding The third, and perhaps most crucial, issue raised by the 1982-83 Brazilian negotiations with banks and the IMF is the lamentable state of mechanisms for international debt rescheduling. Banks, the IMF, and governments all seem caught in a clumsy process that no one really regards as the best way to handle unforeseen, unfavorable circumstances; yet no one has yet shown the leadership to put in place or even suggest a more sensible arrangement. Ingenuity and resourcefulness have been shown by several important actors in the international financial game, not the least having been displayed by the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. Although those efforts have avoided financial panic, they have been insufficient to prevent unnecessary, secondary adjustment costs to Brazil and others and unnecessary threats to international recovery. Since August 1982 the world has lived with international financial markets that are neither free and competitive nor effectively planned; a peculiar semicartelization shakily managed by central banks and the IMF has inflicted on countries like Brazil the costs of monopoly (for example, larger spreads and fees) without some of its benefits (the ability to plan ahead). The short-leash, hand-to-mouth process of handling the Brazilian debt service since August 1982 is offensive not only to Brazilian national pride but also to economic rationality.
The 1982-83 "Great Fear" thrust the IMF into center stage of reschedulings. Despite misgivings about past and present IMF policies and lending practices, it could be argued that, even for Brazil, it was better to have an imperfect IMF at hand than having no IMF at all. Yet it is debatable that a role acceptable in a crisis should become a permanent IMF responsibility. The international equivalent to "bankruptcyjudges" found in the United States and other industrial countries remains to be created. The IMF, being itself a lender and borrower, even if in a unique nonprofit fashion, would not be institutionally suited for the role of bankruptcy judge, even if it had plentiful funds to finance what it regards as ideal stabilization plans. An expanded and revitalized IMF plus other multilateral institutions could reduce unexpected debt reschedulings by acting as countercyclical lenders, for example by having a much larger compensatory financing facility. But even under those circumstances problems are likely to remain, calling for a more orderly and impartial debt rescheduling process than the present one.
Throughout history both borrowers and lenders have made mistakes and locked themselves into contracts not suitable for coping with unexpected shocks. During 1982-83, lenders on the whole appear to have even profited from past mistakes, while borrowers bore a disproportionate burden of adjusting to the bad news. The weakness of the rescheduling process, which promises so few fresh funds and so little growing space, together with the perceived imbalance in paying for past errors, provides the temptation for Brazil to break the negotiating impasse and step into the leadership void by suggesting to creditors its own rescheduling plan. Doing so with suitable bargaining bravado would also help to gain local support for austerity measures and policy reforms, and perhaps could also induce neighbors to adhere to Brazilian proposals. The precise shape of a Brazilian stabilization program that is politically and economically viable can only be decided by Brazilians. However, a foreign economist can point out that a plan that succeeds in moving toward internal and external balance in the context of reviving growth is likely to include the following features:
1. There should be a substantial real depreciation of the exchange rate relative to the 1981-82 levels. Recovery from the depression of the early 1930s involved sharp real depreciations; on this point a repetition of history is warranted. In the near term at least, maintenance of exchange and import controls seems inevitable; the costs of the latter appear greater than those of the former.
2. External debt-service rescheduling that is more drastic than it has been in the past is also called for, and should include a reexamination of spreads and fees, as well as ceilings on the share of foreign exchange earnings that may be absorbed by interest payments in any given year. Rollovers of principal should be extended well into the future, perhaps by creating new debt instruments.
3. Indexation schemes should be revised to exclude price increases arising from supply shocks or deterioration in the external terms of trade, while making the indexation formulas sensitive to expectations about future inflation. As this implies a form of incomes policy, mechanisms to convince workers and public opinion that inflation forecasts will be unbiased, unlike the experience of the late 1960s and early 1970s, would be highly desirable, if not necessary.
4. Budgetary and monetary accounts should be developed and presented in a way that allows a rational discussion of the level and changes in public aggregate demand and financial requirements and permits a distinction between cyclical and structural causes of budget deficits. By late 1983 it was very doubtful that the budget deficit was a major cause of either internal or external imbalance. The budget targets for 1984, if achieved, would help only marginally to reach external balance and to lower inflation; those marginal gains would be achieved at severe costs in domestic employment and output. This need to avoid a more depressing fiscal policy in the short run must not obscure the need for a major revision of the social benefit-cost calculus involved in public investments and other expenditures that, after twenty years of authoritarian military government, show signs of serious inefficiencies. Revision of public sector accounts from a long-term perspective could very well lead to a relative reduction of investments in large projects and an expansion in social expenditures, such as those in health and education, plus a more efficient and equitable tax system. 5. A monetary and financial policy is needed that, in the short term, avoids the bankruptcy of sound firms with temporary liquidity problems. Medium-term targets in this area are likely to include a clearer separation of monetary and fiscal policies; the preservation of safe and remunerative financial assets for small and medium savers; and a domestic financial market offering a broader spectrum of private and public instruments, with a wider range of risk and return characteristics. The counterfactual scenario involves projecting forward external receipts and payments on various assumptions about prudent behavior, and deriving allowable imports as a residual from the other projections. Diaz-Alejandro's "prudent planner" would have engaged in an extremely restrictive policy on the basis of this scenario in 1980 and 1981. One of the assumptions on which projections are made is that net external debt should grow at a rate no greater than the interest rate that Brazil faced in international markets, which is estimated by the author at 12.5 percent. There is a vague invocation of growth theory to support this condition.
Such growth in external debt is excessively conservative in a year such as 1979. One point to be made is that Brazil was not on an equilibrium growth path in that year, so rules stemming from growth theory have little relevance. A second and more important point is that 1979 was a year of rapidly escalating oil prices. That development created large new energy-saving investment opportunities in Brazil, along with unexpected obsolescence of part of the existing capital stock. Furthermore, the contractionary impact of higher oil prices would have led to a secondary loss in output, part of which could have been avoided by borrowing (indirectly from OPEC, which was running large surpluses in 1979-80). Thus a Brazilian strategy of borrowing in excess of the interest rate was 543 not obviously foolish. As the data in table 2 of the paper show, actual borrowing was substantially in excess of what the author's prudent planners would have allowed; these data support, along with sharply higher exports, a much larger value of imports than his counterfactual scenario would have permitted.
Taken by itself, this seems to me to represent sensible policy. It is complicated in reality by the fact that the Brazilians did not allow domestic oil prices to rise with world prices, so that the investment opportunities and the contractionary effects of an increase in oil prices mentioned above were attenuated. Moreover, the new economic management in late 1979 pledged rather uncritically to grow out of Brazil's evident difficulties through increased government expenditures, partly on enlarged subsidies to the agricultural sector as well as for oil. This strategy is reminiscent of Harold Wilson's unsuccessful attempt to grow out of Britain's balance-of-payments difficulties in 1964, a strategy that hardly inspired confidence. Finally, "improvements" in the scheme of wage indexation were introduced that had the effect of increasing wage indexation in principle to 100 percent of price increases. In practice, on average, indexation turned out in excess of 100 percent of price increases, with much more for workers with low pay. This change in policy, during a period of rapid change in relative prices, would hamstring Brazil's economic policy during subsequent years, as Diaz-Alejandro points out.
The Rather than engage in vague innuendo, critics of the IMF should focus on the mistakes that its staff make in their analysis of the situation and in their detailed prescriptions, given the constraints that operate both on the IMF and on the country whose economy is being stabilized. DiazAlejandro offers one such criticism. He suggests that the targeted budget deficit should be defined as the real value of the change in the government's liabilities. Although such an inflation-corrected budget is useful for some purposes, I am doubtful that enough is known about the difference in behavioral responses to legislated tax increases, as compared with an inflation tax on outstanding bonds or other government liabilities (many of which are held by institutions or held abroad) to substitute this budgetary concept for the public sector borrowing requirement preferred by the IMF. Furthermore, intermediate policy targets resulting from agreements between the IMF and the respective country must meet two criteria: the targets must be directly under the control of the government, and they must involve timely and accurate information. An inflation-corrected budget deficit does not meet these criteria. If, however, the criticism is meant to imply that in setting budget targets the IMF should allow for the momentum of inflation, that is surely correct. In particular, it can only be considered a blunder if in setting the budgetary target the IMF did not allow for the influence of the February maxi-devaluation on debt-servicing requirements of government and government-owned enterprises with respect to debt denominated in foreign currency, or if it did not allow for the impact on government payrolls of automatic wage indexation.
A targeted drop in the public sector deficit (including state enterprises) from 16.9 to 8.8 percent of GNP in one year seems drastic even without the problem created by a major devaluation combined with indexation of wages and heavy foreign debt. The operative question is whether there was an alternative way to accomplish the same reduction in payments deficit, consistent with the IMF's commitment to currency convertibility for current transactions. I do not know enough about Brazil's economy to be able to answer that question. Most criticisms of IMF stabilization programs do not involve technical suggestions concerning how the objective could have been achieved at lower cost, but rather the suggestion that the IMF-that is, in effect, the international community-should have lent more to the country in question rather than requiring it to adjust so much. In the circumstances of the past three years, and especially since the developments in the private financial market in late 1982 following the Mexican crisis, I concur in this suggestion. But the IMF itself has limited resources. It advisedly proposed a 100 percent increase in quotas in 1982. That this proposal was rejected should be laid at the feet of the major members of the IMF, in particular the United States and several European countries, and not at the IMF as an institution.
Generalized criticisms of the IMF long antedate the past three years. The IMF is typically made a scapegoat for the need to adjust at all, and economists should resist rather than join in such misguided disapprobation.
Diaz-Alejandro concludes with a general lament about current arrangements for rescheduling. His lament comes at a time when many proposals for substantial institutional reform of rescheduling have been put forward, and he therefore implies support for at least some of these proposals. In my view the path of rescheduling that is now under waypiecemeal, case by case, with a number of cliff-hangers-while clearly difficult and uncomfortable, is superior to any alternative path involving institutional reform in the current circumstances. Virtually all proposals involve imposing actual or contingent liabilities directly or indirectly on the taxpayers of the major industrial countries and would require parliamentary approval. The prolonged and inevitably acrimonious public debate that would take place in the legislatures of these countries would lead to a drying up of the flow of fresh funds to developing countries that must continue if we are to get through the current world financial crisis at all, as banks' lawyers advise management to make no new loans until the legislative situation clears. A legislated solution is therefore a more dangerous path out of the current woods than the path we are now on. Improvements can be made in existing institutional arrangements, such as rescheduling debt due in the next two or three years rather than merely debt due in the next one to one and a half years, as is now typical. The policy response to the Brazilian payments crisis has been a strategy of "muddling through." Economic activity has been depressed sharply to reduce imports and free foreign exchange to make at least a partial payment on debt service. At the same time the major part of interest payments has been met by increased bank borrowing and some official lending. Currently Brazil pays $3 billion in interest to maintain access to $10 billion of import financing, without which imports would literally cease. The import-financing requirement makes it worth paying a 33 percent rate of interest.
Two objectives seem to be implicit in recent policies. The first is preventing a Brazilian default and confining the decline in economic activity to a minimum while improving external creditworthiness. The second is, in line with IMF program goals, a dramatic restructuring of aggregate demand through a reduction in the size and deficit of the public sector. In pursuing these objectives, expenditure-reducing policies have been used with no consideration for adjustment and export-led growth through "expenditure switching."
Discussions of the debt problem in early 1983 focused on the debtexport ratio, BIX. This ratio will rise to the extent that interest payments exceed the foreign exchange earnings from net exports of goods and services other than interest. At the same time, the ratio will decline to the extent that export earnings in dollars rise. The rate of increase of this debt-export ratio, can be expressed as Percent change in BIX = i -S/B -x, where i is the nominal interest rate; S/B, the ratio of the noninterest current account surplus to the external debt; and x, the growth rate of dollar export earnings. The interest rate, including fees and risk premiums, is now about 13 percent. Export earnings have been growing thus far at about 7 percent a year, significantly below expectations, and the noninterest surplus is expected to be about 3 to 4 percent of debt. Presently the debt-export ratio is thus rising at a rate of about 2 to 3 percent a year. Continuing world recovery, without significant increases in interest rates, is expected to lead to a stronger reduction in the next year and beyond. But for that algebra to work, as is apparent from the equation above, there is a close race between export growth and nominal interest rates. Some forecasters see Brazilian export earnings growing by 30 percent in 1984, generating great hope of cyclical recovery for the terms of trade and dollar depreciation as well as real growth in industrial countries. That may well be the case, as it was in 1970-74, but perhaps the pattern of the past five years, with export growth averaging only about 10 percent a year, is a better forecast. In that event any improvement in the debt-export ratio will have to come increasingly from an improvement in the noninterest current account. That means either a continuing and even deepening of the recession or a dramatic shift in trade performance due to expenditure-switching policies.
The algebra of debt-export ratios draws attention to a number of issues central to Brazil's debt crisis. First, as Diaz-Alejandro has shown clearly in his paper, a monetarist recession in industrial countries directly exerts an adverse effect on debtors by raising their interest cost while at the same time depressing their export earnings. Dollar appreciation has strongly reinforced this effect. Second, the risk premium charged on Brazilian debt has reached the point of absurdity. Simply because the risk premium is high, the debt-export ratio deteriorates more rapidly and makes the country less creditworthy unless compensating domestic depression increases the noninterest surplus ratio, S/B. The increased depression in turn enhances the chances of debt repudiation even though the country is ultimately solvent.
In the early 1970s Brazil's debt-export ratio was about 2: 1, which was considered "safe." Today it is about 4:1. To return to a safe ratio that removes the threat of recurrent liquidity crises, Brazil will have to take drastic action to expand its export earnings. The growth in dollar-export prices, in Brazilian terms of trade, is largely beyond control and, in the midst of a depression, it would be unwise to rely on the prospect of recovery and dollar depreciation abroad. The safe course is to bring about sharp increases in exports by a strong real depreciation that raises, in the medium term, the share of exports in GDP from the current range of 8 to 10 percent to about 15 percent.
A policy of export promotion is also essential if the deficits in the domestic public sector are eliminated and thus aggregate demand, in the short run, is being reduced. The resources released by the public sector and by households whose disposable income declines because of fiscal contraction must be employed in a manner consistent with the external balance constraints. Therefore the real exchange rate must be depreciated to shift resources toward the traded goods sector. Failure to use exports as a source of growth will imply a deterioration of medium-term growth of the kind that has plagued Argentina, for example.
The IMF program does not appear to include provision for a real depreciation, and the devaluation of February 1983 does not go far beyond making up the losses in international competitiveness incurred since 1980. A real depreciation is very costly, of course, because of its short-run adverse impact on inflation and on employment. But because this real depreciation is the central instrument to promote medium-term growth, and hence social stability, it should be given precedence over fiscal stabilization and inflation targets. The alliance between banks, which prefer to "muddle through," and the IMF, which favors fiscal stabilization, does not recognize the need to provide growth if debt repudiation is to be avoided.
Some fiscal stabilization and a reduction of inflation are undoubtedly desirable and perhaps even necessary for a resumption of stable growth. But it is certainly not essential that the stabilization proceed with the vigor scheduled in the IMF-3 program. It would be sensible to postpone some of the fiscal stabilization, in particular some removal of food subsidies, until after the shocks of inflation and unemployment from real depreciation have been absorbed. In the meantime it becomes quite conceivable that domestic restrictive policy, not lack of import financing, is the effective constraint on recovery. That would make the case for a relaxation of monetary policy, placing the responsibility for a successful real depreciation on incomes policy rather than on the depression.
General Discussion
Jeffrey Sachs argued that an analysis of the debt problem requires projections of the future that are missing from Diaz's paper. These should include projections of capacity and demand in the tradable goods sector, relative price changes, and debt burdens, all under a reasonable range of possible policies and world economic developments. He suspected that such projections would reveal that the present debt burden is not exceptionally large under at least some likely future developments. Diaz agreed that such projections are desirable, in principle, but believed that the range of possible outcomes would be very wide.
Many comments addressed the role of the International Monetary Fund in the Brazilian debt problem. In contrast to Diaz's proposal that the client country should choose its own adjustment policies so long as it meets balance-of-payments targets, several discussants defended the IMF practice of setting goals for policy instruments. Peter Kenen stressed that the achievement of a balance-of-payments target does not imply the policies that produced it will continue to have the same result over time. For example, the reduction of imports that can be achieved by running down inventories is not a sustainable balance-of-payments policy. He reasoned that the IMF must be able to monitor policy variables to ensure a viable outcome.
In a related vein, Robert Lawrence observed that, because of lags and J-curve effects, policies appropriate for the longer run can yield perverse balance-of-payments results in the near term. Furthermore, without policy targets from the IMF, there would be too much domestic political pressure to avoid or abandon policies that cause domestic hardships but that are necessary for balance of payments. John Williamson reasoned that policy targets are needed both because necessary policies must be enforced, even if unpopular, and because balance-ofpayments developments are not always controllable. For instance, it would be wrong to place a country in the noncompliance category because an external shock worsens its trade balance. He added that targets for policies have to be realistic and should be adjusted in response to exogenous shocks.
Diaz acknowledged the need for policy changes in the present Brazilian crisis and in general. But he reiterated his objection to the emphasis on policy criteria set by the IMF on two grounds: first, the macroeconomic connection between traditional policy instruments and balanceof-payments objectives is too uncertain; second, the social side effects from various policies will vary greatly from one country to another. Lawrence Krause countered that IMF policy targets were already set with an awareness of the special characteristics of countries. The IMF played the vital role of making unpleasant adjustment programs politically palatable. But such programs are based on discussions with groups inside the country that are knowledgeable about the economic situation and about what is politically feasible. In this process, he viewed the IMF as the external force that persuades the country to do the right thing, although the right thing is ultimately determined by a group within the country.
Quite apart from the general question of whether policy targets should be set at all, many participants agreed that present policy targets are too restrictive. Williamson reasoned that the proposed swing toward surplus of 6 percent of GNP in the budget deficit is too restrictive. Charles Schultze agreed, estimating that this is equivalent to a swing of about $300 billion in the U.S. structural deficit. James Tobin argued that, in applying such restrictive policy targets for Brazil and other nations with debt problems, the IMF would collectively worsen the world recession, which was an important cause of the debt problems in the first place. He reasoned that the responsibility for getting out of the world debt crisis lay with the major industrial economies, which inevitably would have to be the locomotives of world economic recovery.
Kenen recommended that leverage be applied to the commercial banks to increase the period between debt rescheduling from the present practice of one year to three or four years. This would bring it in line with the three-year commitment of IMF lending programs. George von Furstenberg proposed that risk premiums not be included in the interest rates negotiated at rescheduling. Unlike risk premiums on private loans that are required to build reserves against possible future losses of principal, in a loan to a sovereign country the role of the risk premium is mainly to signal to the country that it is becoming overcommited and that it faces possible curtailment of credit. Once that signal has been received and economic policies have been adjusted so as to contain new borrowing, there is nojustification for charging the premium. Negotiated policy commitments that provide reliable means of adjusting financial positions can thus be viewed as a substitute for the risk premiums that might otherwise be required to restrain a sovereign borrower.
